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Iconology, visual culture and media aestetics1
 THERE ARE NO VISUAL MEDIA
“Visual media” is a colloquial expression used to designate things 
like TV, movies, photography, painting, and so on. But it is highly 
inexact and misleading. All the so-called visual media turn out, on 
closer inspection, to involve the other senses (especially touch and 
hearing). All media are, from the standpoint of sensory modal-
ity, “mixed media.” The obviousness of this raises two questions: 
(1) Why do we persist in talking about some media as if they were 
exclusively visual? Is this just a shorthand for talking about visual 
predominance? And if so, what does “predominance” mean? Is it 
a quantitative issue (more visual information than aural or tac-
tile)? Or a question of qualitative perception, the sense of things 
reported by a beholder, audience, viewer/listener? (2) Why does 
it matter what we call “visual media”? Why should we care about 
straightening out this confusion? What is at stake? 
First, let me belabor the obvious. Can it really be the case that 
there are no visual media despite our incorrigible habit of talking 
1 We present fragments of three chapters from the book written by W. J. T. Mitchell 
Image science. Iconology, visual culture, and media aestetics, University of Chicago 
Press, 2015.
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as if there were? My claim can, of course, be refuted with just a sin-
gle counterexample. So let me anticipate this move with roundup 
of the usual suspects, commonly proposed as examples of purely 
or exclusively visual media. Let’s rule out, first, the whole arena of 
mass media – television, movies, radio – as well as performance 
media (dance, theater). From Aristotle’s observation that drama 
combines the three ordres of lexis, melos, and opsis (words, music 
and spectacle) to Barthes’ survey of the “image/music/text” divi-
sions of the semiotic field, the mixed character of media has been 
a central postulate. Any notion of purity seems out of the question 
with these ancient and modern media, from the standpoint both 
of the sensory and semiotic elements internal to them and of what 
is external in their promiscuous audience composition. And if it 
is argued that silent film was a “purely visual” medium, we need 
only remind ourselves of a simple fact of film history – that the 
silents were always accompanied by music and speech, and the 
film texts themselves often had written or printed words inscribed 
on them. Subtitles, intertitles, and spoken and musical accompa-
niment made “silent” film anything but.
If we are looking for the best case of a purely visual medium, 
painting seems like the obvious candidate. It is, after all, the cen-
tral, canonical medium of art history. And after an early history 
tainted by literary considerations, we do have a canonical story of 
purification, in which painting emancipates itself from language, 
narrative, allegory, figuration, and even the representation of 
nameable objects in order to explore something called “pure 
painting,” characterized by “pure opticality.” This argument, 
most famously circulated by Clement Greenberg, and sometimes 
echoed by Michael Fried, insist on the purity and specificity of 
media, rejecting hybrid forms, mixed media, and anything that 
lies “between the arts” as a form of “theater” or rhetoric, doom-
ing them to inauthenticity and second-rate aesthetic status.2 It is 
2 Greenberg’s argument appear in his classic essays “Toward a Newer Laocoon,” 
Partisan Review (1940), and “Avant Garde and Kitsch,” Partisan Review (1939), 
reprinted in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism, ed. John 
O’Brian, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Fried’s anti-
theatrical polemic first appeared in “Art and Objecthood,” Artforum ( June 1967), 
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one of the most familiar and threadbare myths of modernism, 
and it is time now to lay it to rest. The fact is that even at its 
purest and most single-mindedly optical, modernist painting 
was always, to echo Tom’s Wolfe’s phrase, “painted words.”3 The 
words were not those of history painting or poetic landscape 
or myth or religious, but the discourse of theory, of idealist and 
critical philosophy. This critical discourse was just as crucial to 
the comprehension of modernist painting as the Bible or his-
tory or the classics were to the traditional narrative painting. 
 Without the latter, beholder would be left standing in front of 
Guido Reni’s Beatrice Cenci the Day before Her Execution, in the 
situation of Mark Twain, who noted that an uninstructed viewer 
who did not know the title and the story would have to conclude 
that this was a picture of a young girl with a cold, or young girl 
about to have a nosebleed. Without the former, the uninstructed 
viewer would (and did) see the paintings of Jackson Polloc as 
“nothing but wallpaper.”
Some will object that the “words” that make it possible to 
appreciate and understand painting are not in the painting in the 
same way that the words of Ovid are illustrated in a Claude Lor-
rain. And you might be right; it would be important to distinguish 
the different ways language enters painting. But that is not my aim 
here. My present task is only to show that the painting we have 
habitually called “purely optical,” exemplifying a purely visual use 
of the medium, is anything but. The question of precisely how 
language enters into the perception of these pure objects will have 
to wait for another occasion. 
Supposed it were the case that language could be absolutely 
banished from painting? I don’t deny that this was a character-
istic desire of modernist painting, symptomatized by the ritual-
istic refusal of titles for pictures, the enigmatic challenge of the 
“ untitled” to the viewer. Suppose for a moment that the viewer 
could look without verbalizing, could see without (even silently, 
reprinted in Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998). 
3 Wolfe, The Painted Word (New York: Bantam Brooks, 1976).
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internally) subvocalizing associations, judgements, and observa-
tions. What would be left? Well, one thing that would obviously 
be left is the observation that a painting is a handmade object, one 
of the crucial things that differentiates it from, say, the medium of 
photography, where the look of mechanical production is often 
foregrounded. (I leave aside for the moment the fact that a painter 
can do an excellent job of imitating the machinic look of a glossy 
photo and that a photographer with the right techniques can, 
similarly, imitate the painterly surface and sfumato of a painter). 
But what is the perception of the painting as handmade if not 
a recognition that a nonvisual sense is encoded, manifested, and 
indicated in every detail of its material existence? (Robert Mor-
ris’s Blind Dime Drawings, drawn by hand with powdered graph-
ite on paper, according to rigorous procedures of temporal and 
spatial targeting that are duly recorded in hand-inscribed texts 
on the lower margin, would be powerful cases for reflection on 
the quite literally nonvisual character of drawing). The nonvisual 
sense is, of course, the sense of touch, which is foregrounded in 
some kinds of painting (when “handling,” impasto, and the mate-
riality of the paint is emphasized) and backgrounded in others 
(when a smooth surface and clear, transparent forms produce 
the miraculous effect of rendering the painter’s manual activity 
invisible). Either way, the beholder who knows nothing about 
the theory behind the painting, or the story of allegory, need 
only understand that this is a painting, a handmade object, to 
understand that it is a trace of manual production, that everything 
one sees is the trace of brush or a hand touching a canvas. Seeing 
painting is seeing touching, seeing the hand gestures of the artist, 
which is why we are so rigorously prohibited from touching the 
canvas ourselves.
This argument is not, by the way, intended to consign the 
notion of pure opticality to the dustbin of history. The point is, 
rather, to assess what its historical role in fact was, and why the 
purely visual character of modernist painting was elevated to the 
status of fetish concept, despite abundant evidence that it was 
a myth. What was the purification of the visual medium all about? 
What form of contamination was being attacked? In the name of 
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what form of sensory hygiene and (as Jacques Rancière would 
put it) “redistribution of the sensible”?4
The other media that occupy the attention of art history seem 
even less likely to sustain a case for pure opticality. Architecture, 
the impurest medium of all, incorporates all the other arts in 
a  gesamstkunstwerk, and it is typically not even “looked at” with 
any concentrated attention, but rather perceived, as Walter Ben-
jamin noted, in state of distraction.5 Architecture is not primarily 
about seeing but about dwelling and inhabiting. Sculpture is so 
clearly an art of tactile that it seems superfluous to argue about it. 
This is the one so-called visual medium, in fact, that has a kind of 
direct accessibility to the blind. Photography, the latecomer to art 
history’s media repertoire, is typically so riddled with language, as 
theorists from Barthes to Victor Burgin have shown, that it is hard 
to imagine what it would mean to call it purely visual medium. Its 
specific role in what Joel Snyder has called “picturing the invisi-
ble” – showing us what we do not or cannot see with the “naked 
eye” (rapid body motions, the behavior of matter, the ordinary and 
everyday) makes it difficult to think of it as a visual medium in any 
straightforward sense.6 Photography of this sort might be better 
understood as a device for translating the unseen or unseeable into 
something that looks like a picture of something we could see if 
we had incredible keen eyesight or different habits of attention.
From the standpoint of art history in the wake of postmodern-
ism, it seems clear that the last half century has decisively under-
mined any notion of purely visual art. Installations, mixed media 
performance art, conceptual art, site specific art, minimalism, and 
the often-remarked return to pictorial representation have ren-
dered the notion of pure opticality a mirage that is retreating in 
4 Rancière, “The Distribution of the Sensible,” in The Future of the Image (New 
York: Verso, 2009); Caroline Jones, Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg and the 
Bureaucratization of the Senses (University of Chicago Press, 2008).
5 “Architecture has always offered the prototype of an artwork that is received in 
state of distraction.” “The Work of Art in the Age of its Reproducibility,” in Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Writings (Cambridge, MA: Harward University Press, 2002), 
3:119.
6 Snyder, “Picturing Vision,” Critical Inquiry 6, no. 3 (Spring 1980): 499-526.
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rear-view mirror. For art historians today, the safest conclusion 
would be that the notion of purely visual work of art was a tempo-
rary anomaly, a deviation from the much more durable tradition 
of mixed and hybrid media.
Of course, this argument can go so far that it seems to defeat 
itself. How, you will object, can there be any mixed media or multi-
media productions unless there are elemental, pure, distinct media 
out there to go into the mix? If all media are always and already 
mixed media, then the notion of mixed media is emptied of impor-
tance, since it would not distinguish any specific mixture from any 
purely elemental instance. Here, I think, we must take hold of the 
conundrum from both ends and recognize that one corollary of 
the claim that “there are no visual media” is that all media are mixed 
media. That is, the very notion of a medium and of meditation 
already entails some mixture of sensory, perceptual and semiotic 
elements. There are no purely auditory, tactile, or olfactory media 
either. This conclusion does not lead, however, to the impossibil-
ity of distinguishing one medium from another. What makes it 
possible is a more precise differentiation of mixtures. If all media 
are mixed media, they are not all mixed in the same way, with the 
same proportions of elements. A medium, as Raymond Williams 
puts it, is a “material social practice,” not a specifiable essence 
dictated by some elemental materiality (paint, stone, metal) or 
by technique or technology.7 Materials and technologies go into 
a medium, but so do skills, habits, social spaces, institutions, and 
markets. The notion of “medium specificity,” then, is never derived 
from a singular, elemental essence: it is more like the specificity 
(and plural singularity) associated with recipes in cooking: many 
ingredients, combined in a specific order in specific proportions, 
mixed in particular ways, and cooked at specific temperatures for 
a specific amount of time. One can, in short, affirm that there are 
no “visual media,” that all media are mixed media, without losing 
concept of medium specificity.8 […]
7 Williams, “From Medium to Social Practice,” in Marxism and Literature (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 158-64.
8 Rosalind Krauss come close to this account when she describes a medium as 
a “self-differentiating” entity in “The Post-Medium Condition.” Krauss, Voyage 
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 BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD
Walter Benjamin remarks at the conclusion of his classic essay 
“Kunstwerk” that “architecture has always offered the prototype 
of a work of art that is received in a state of distraction.”9 Count 
me among that distracted collectivity that recognizes, with Ben-
jamin, that architecture’s history “is more ancient than that of any 
other art,” and that it is a “living force” that has importance in 
“every attempt to comprehend the relationship of the masses to 
art,” at the same time that I have to confess a fair amount of igno-
rance about the inner world of professional architectural practice. 
I write here as a consumer, a spectator and user of architecture, 
not as an expert.10
The fundamental question asked at the 2008 Bauhaus sym-
posium was what the effects of digital imaging have been on the 
production and reception of architecture. One hears on every side 
grand, utopian claims about the unlimited possibilities offered by 
“paperless studios” and direct translation of computer design into 
the production of materials and modular units for construction. 
It seems, if one can trust the architecture magazines, that we have 
entered a brave new world where everything is possible and noth-
ing is out of bounds: if it can be imagined, and “imagineered” on 
a computer terminal, then it can be built.
I think there are good reasons for being skeptical about the 
more euphoric claims that surround architecture in the so-called 
digital age. Although it’s clear that the computer has made an enor-
mous difference in certain aspects of architectural design and con-
struction, it may not always be the emancipatory, progressive dif-
ference that it is often portrayed to be. Liberation from the material 
resistance of a medium may lead to a kind of architectural flatu-
on the North Sea: Art in the Age of the Post-Medium Condition (New York: Thames 
and Hudson, 2000), 53. 
9 “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility,” in Walter Benjamin: Selected 
Writings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 3:119.
10 I am very grateful to architectural historian Katherine Taylor of the University 
of Chicago Department of Art History for invaluable advice, and to Anthony 
Raynsford for the key reminder that architecture is basically drawing.
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lence, a throwing up of ornamental effects and spectacle as nothing 
more than a manner or automatism of conspicuous consumption. 
I am reminded of the moment in the evolution of electronic music 
when the “classic studio” of wave-form generators and manually 
controlled tape decks was replaced by the Moog Synthesizer, 
which made all sorts of preprogrammed “special effects” available 
at the touch of a key, a breakthrough that led to the production of 
a great many predictable, cliché-ridden sound-effects. Sometimes 
the resistance of a medium is a good thing, and it may be (as cop-
perplate engraving once showed us) the very condition of certain 
kinds of hard-won virtuosity and inventiveness.
So: my aim here will be to slow down the discussion a bit, and 
to urge a more patient analysis of claims that we live in a “digital 
age,” and that certain consequences flow ineluctably from this 
supposed fact. Since I speak as a nonexpert, and an outsider to the 
professional concerns of the architectural community, I offer these 
comments with considerable hesitation, and subject to correction. 
My own expertise is in the areas of image theory, media, and visual 
culture. My strategy, therefore, will be to reflect on some notable 
features of spectacular, attention-getting architecture in our time, 
especially as it engages with two closely related media, the graphic 
and sculptural arts. These two media seem necessarily connected 
to the problem of architecture, if only because, on the one hand, so 
much contemporary architecture seems to aspire to the condition 
of sculpture and, on the other, architecture “proper” is primarily 
a graphic, imaging activity, and not the actual activity of erect-
ing buildings. Even before the onset of the digital image, Thomas 
Creighton, the editor of Progressive Architecture, could argue that 
a “new sensualism” in architecture was being driven by the model 
of sculpture, with abandonment of “restraint” and its freedom to 
produce forms “that can be warped and twisted at will.”11 “This is 
not the application of sculpture to architecture,” argued Creighton, 
“but rather the handling of architecture as sculpture.”
On the other flank of architectural practice is drawing and 
draftsmanship, now undergoing the technical transformation 
11 Quoted in Joseph Rosa, Folds, Blobs, and Boxes: Architecture in the Digital Era 
(Heinz Architectural Center, Pittsburgh, 2001), 9.
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summed up by the concept of the digital image and the tech-
niques of computer-aided drawing (CAD). But what is the digi-
tal image? The easiest answer is: an image that can be produced, 
manipulated, stored, and retrieved by a computer. But what does 
this really mean? How does this affect the quality of the image, 
any image? Is it the easy manipulability of the image? The pos-
sibility of morphing and transforming it in innumerable ways? 
Or is it the portability of the image, the ease with which it can be 
transmitted instantaneously around the globe? Is it the metadata 
that accompanies the image, making it a self-archiving bundle of 
information that carries with it not only the graphic analog content 
but a string of second-order information about its provenance and 
modifications?
All these are undoubtedly momentous changes in the way 
images function for us, but it is important to keep in mind one 
equally important way in which images have not changed under 
the digital regime: they are still images for us, for embodied human 
beings with standard sensory and perceptual equipment. It doesn’t 
matter whether they are representational or abstract, artistic or 
popular, technoscientific displays or children’s drawings. At the 
end of the day, they are still dense, iconic signs that acquire their 
meaning within the framework of an analogical, not a digital code. 
(In a more extended discussion we would have to question in 
fact whether the analogical sign is “coded” at all, recalling Roland 
Barthes’s famous observation that photography produces “images 
without a code”).12 No matter how many computational transfor-
mations it goes through inside a computer, the digital image is, at 
the beginning and end of the day, an image, an analog presentation. 
Unless we are programmers, we are not really interested in the 
digits in the digital image. We are interested in the analogical input 
and output, the image, as a sensuous presentation that employs an 
infinitely gradated set of signs, marks, and colors (or, for that mat-
ter, sounds, tones, beats). Digitization betrays the same ineluctable 
12 Barthes, Camera Lucida trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill & Wang, 1981), 
88; see also my discussion of the uncoded “wildness” of the iconic sign in What 
Do Pictures Want? On the Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2005), 9-10.
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tendency toward the “return of the analog” in the realm of both 
visual and sound images.13
So the phrase “digital image” is in a very precise sense a kind 
of oxymoron: insofar as an image is perceived as digital, it is not an 
image at all but an array of arbitrary symbolic elements, alphanu-
meric signs that belong to a finite set of rigorously differentiated 
characters. At the simplest level, the digital is merely a string of 
ones and zeros that forms a statement or operation in a machine 
language; this is not an image, but a string of ones and zeros that 
can be translated into an image. The image is formed by, carried 
by, translated into digits, but it is not itself digital. One can see this 
clearly in the climactic scene of the mythic cinematic treatment 
of the digital age, The Matrix. When Neo sees through the veil of 
illusory virtual images to the underlying digital reality, he under-
stands that all those bodies and buildings were nothing but a flux 
of numbers and letters. But at the moment of this understanding 
there is a ghostly return of the displaced illusion in the form of the 
analog images of the agents, and the spectral traces of their illusory 
bullets. This is also the return of the image as such, the analog sign, 
the cinematic sign, that can never go all the way over to the digital 
without ceasing to be an image.14
This is also why we have to admit that, from a phenomenologi-
cal standpoint that pays attention to the perceptual flutter of digital 
and analogic representations, digital images existed long before 
the invention of the computer or binary code. Images have been 
digitized since Australian Aboriginal painters developed a binary 
dot and line vocabulary of graphic characters suitable for sand 
painting. Grains of sand are the predecessors of pixels, with their 
indefinitely expanded reservoir of finitely differentiated elements. 
In a similar way, the warp and woof of weaving processes the 
image-appearance through a grid of binary choices. Digitization 
of the image is a consistent technical feature from mosaic tile to 
13 See Brian Massumi, “On the Superiority of the Analog,” in Parables for the Virtual 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).
14 One could say, however, that this would be an image of the digital as such, a spec-
tacularizing of the look of code.
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the mezzotint to the Ben-Day dots of newspaper photographs. But 
when we look at the graphic image, we do not look—at least for 
a moment—at the grains of sand, or the threads, tiles, or dots or 
pixels: we look at the image, the analog sign that magically appears 
out of the digital matrix. This is the duck-rabbit effect of the digital 
image in its extended sense.15
It is important, then, to exert some pressure on the common-
place notion that we live in a “digital age,” as if digitization and 
binary codes were unknown before the invention of the Turing 
Machine. Right alongside the Turing Machine is an equally power-
ful invention/discovery: the architecture of the DNA molecule. 
The technical impact of the computer is not simply its capacity 
to reduce everything to ones and zeros, but its equally powerful 
capacity to unreduce or expand those ones and zeros to analog 
appearances. The computer does not represent a “victory of the 
digital” but a new mechanism for coordinating the digital and 
the analog. And it is crucial to stress this point at the level of tac-
tility as well as visuality: a moment’s reflection on the role of the 
human hand in relation to the computer should remind us of Bill 
Brown’s tellingly nonredundant aphorism: “the digital age is the 
digital age,” the era of carpal tunnel syndrome and ergonomic key-
boards. Obsessive text messagers live in the age of the thumb, and 
of a generation that is “all thumbs.”16 We have invented in our time 
new forms of clumsiness along with new skill sets, automatisms, 
and habitual subroutines. What Friedrich Kittler has predicted as 
a “general digitization of channels and information” that will “erase 
the differences among individual media” has in fact produced just 
the opposite: a new Tower of Babel populated by machines that 
cannot communicate with other machines.17 As is well known, for 
any two machines, a third is required to translate, adapt, or coor-
dinate them. How many useless adapters and power transformers 
are cluttering your utility closet? How many remote controls that 
15 See the discussion of the digital image in “Image Science” and “Realism and the 
Digital Image,” chapters 3 and 5 above.
16 “All Thumbs,” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 452.
17 Kittler, Gramaphone Film Typewriter (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1999), 1.
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are supposed to be programmable to exert control (remotely) over 
other remote controls? How long does it take before the sense 
of control gives way to its opposite? How long before the copy 
and paste functions go mad and generate a virus or autoimmune 
disorder? […]
 FOUNDATIONAL SITES AND OCCUPIED SPACES
[…] The idea of a “foundational site,” or Grundungsorte, is in 
a quite literal sense the most fundamental topos one could imagine. 
For a rhetorician, the topos, or topic, is itself a place or site, a topo-
graphical location or “commonplace” in discourse. But a founda-
tional site raises the stakes, or drives them deeper than rhetoric. 
At the most general level it materializes and locates the long-stan-
ding philosophical question of the “grounds” of knowledge and 
of being, bringing all the questions of origins, beginnings, and 
births “down to earth.” Or perhaps placing them “up in the air” of 
a transcendental Absolute? Either way, the notion of a Grundung-
sorte raises the question of the site, of space, place, and landscape 
in the most basic terms, linking the commonplaces of location 
and site specificity to the origins of social space as such. Historical 
events must, as we say, “take place” somewhere, and those places 
are almost automatically sacralized and monumentalized as foun-
dational sites: the “taking place,” as Native Americans say, requires 
a totemic “keeping place” to preserve memory and continuity.18 
The three great religions of the Book, Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam, all converge in the site known as Israel-Palestine, the “Holy 
Land” that is at the center of so many global conflicts today. The 
very idea of democracy seems rooted in Athens. American inde-
pendence and national unity have numerous symbolic founding 
sites: from Plymouth Rock to Independence Hall in Philadelphia 
to Washington, DC. The navel of the Australian aboriginal world is 
located at the magnificent sandstone rock called Uluru in the cen-
18 See Jonathan Bordo, “The Keeping Place, Arising from an Incident on the Land,” 
in Monuments and Memory, Made and Unmade, ed. Margaret Olin and Robert 
Nelson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 157-82.
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tral desert. The delivery of the law (and Hebrew writing)  occurred 
on Mt. Sinai. And every building of any significance requires the 
ritual of “groundbreaking” and the laying of a cornerstone. I was 
taught in catechism that a specific person is designated as the cor-
nerstone of the Catholic church: “Thou are Peter, and upon this 
rock I will build my church.” My seminars on space, place, and 
landscape always begin with an exercise in personal and private 
foundational sites, what I call “places in the heart,” the places that 
come to mind when someone is asked, Where do you come from? 
What place do you revisit in memory and dreams? What location 
do you regard as crucial to your identity?
Foundational sites, then, are both public and private, sacred 
and secular, monumental and trivial. My birthplace and the birth-
place of a nation are both sites of the basic human experience of 
what Hannah Arendt calls “natality,” the appearance of newness 
in the world. As Arendt puts it:
What matters in our context is less the profoundly Roman 
notion that all foundations are re-establishments and recon-
structions than the somehow connected but different idea that 
men are equipped for the logically paradoxical task of making 
a new beginning because they themselves are new beginnings 
and hence beginners, that the very capacity for beginning is 
rooted in natality, in the fact that human beings appear in the 
world by virtue of birth.19
But birth, as we know, is an experience not only of newness, 
but of trauma, of a wounding that leaves often unreadable traces 
and scars, a forgetting that is sometimes beneficial, sometimes not, 
of the painful labor of founding. The monuments to founding thus 
often involve a paradoxical fusion of memory and amnesia. The 
“foundation,” the “cornerstone” of an institution tends to erase the 
uncertainty and pathos of the founding process. The Wiesenthal 
Foundation’s notorious Museum of Tolerance in Jerusalem, ori-
ginally to be designed by Frank Gehry (who has now withdrawn 
19 Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 203.
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from the project), is being built on one of the oldest Arab ceme-
teries in the Middle East, the burial site of the legendary Saladin, 
vanquisher of Richard the Lion-Hearted’s Crusade.20 Founda-
tional sites tend, in general, to be haunted. According to legend, 
the six Hawksmoor Churches in London, designed by Nicholas 
Hawksmoor, a student of Sir Christopher Wren, were laid out in 
a pattern suggestive of a Satanic diagram and had the bodies of 
sacrificial victims buried under their foundations.21 The stability 
of the edifice erected on a “stable foundation” belies the quicksand 
that lies beneath it, and the struggle to establish footings. One 
motive, then, for studying foundational sites is the overcoming of 
this amnesia and the demystifying of the foundational moment, 
commonly presented as a historical necessity and matter of destiny 
or fate, and not of human struggle, sacrifice, and trauma. Every act 
of founding is also an act of losing; every foundation is built upon 
destruction, the ruins of something prior, the ground beneath 
the foundation. As Nietzsche puts it in the Genealogy of Morals, 
“To enable a sanctuary to be set up, a sanctuary has got to be 
destroyed: that is a law…”22
Some foundational sites are designed to preserve rather than 
erase the violence of their origins, as if the whole point were to 
keep the wound fresh, the trauma vividly in view. A case in point 
is the Israeli ritual of remembrance at Masada, the fortress over-
looking the Dead Sea at which Jewish Zealots chose to commit 
collective suicide rather than surrender to the Roman legions. 
This site is commonly understood to be an emblem of modern 
Israel’s determination to destroy itself and its enemies in a nuclear 
20 See Saree Makdisi, “The Architecture of Erasure,” Critical Inquiry 36, no. 3 (Spring 
2010), the opening statement in a debate on this project that includes responses 
from Gehry, Jeremy Gilbert-Rolfe, Daniel Monk, and a team of scholars repre-
senting the Wiesenthal Foundation.
21 Peter Ackroyd’s novel Hawksmoor (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), builds upon 
the legend of the Hawksmoor Churches in London, in which sacrificial victims 
were supposed to have been buried under the foundations. See Susana Onega, 
Metafiction and Myth in the Novels of Peter Ackroyd (Columbia, SC: Camden 
House, 1999), 52f.
22 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, trans. Horace B. Samuel (New York: Dover, 
2003), 95 (II.24).
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conflagration rather than surrender its claim to the ethnic and 
racial nationalism of the Jewish state. The foundational “memo-
ries” reproduced at this site are, of course, remarkably selective. 
They depend, as a young Jewish woman noted in a recent Israeli 
documentary, on the erasure of a crucial fact: the women and 
children at Masada did not commit suicide; they were murdered 
by their men to prevent their becoming Roman slaves.23 It is hard 
to imagine a foundational site for a more ominous national mytho-
logy, a monument to the victory of melancholia over mourning 
and working through.
Unless, of course, we consider the foundational site of what 
is sometimes called the “post-911 era.” The memorial at “Ground 
Zero” in New York City, like Masada, is designed to keep the 
wound open and to facilitate melancholy rituals of selective 
remembrance. The event of 9-11 has been generally regarded as 
both a global trauma and the foundational moment of a new world 
order. The site itself, starting with the misnomer Ground Zero, 
originally coined as the term for the location of a nuclear explo-
sion, has been hyperfetishized and sacralized. The “footprints” 
of the destroyed twin towers are laid bare as inverted fountains 
cascading into darkness, as if the wounds were to be kept bleed-
ing forever. And below the fountains, a descent into the under-
world has been excavated, down to the bedrock, deep below the 
Hudson River to the original footings of the Twin Towers, as if 
it were  necessary to see their deepest foundations to grasp the 
depth of the trauma. The 9-11 Memorial, emblazoned with the 
words “Never Forget,” has at the same time been the centerpiece 
in a narrative of national amnesia that disavows the role of the 
United States in arming al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists 
during the Cold War, as a tactic to contain the Soviet Union. The 
World Trade Center became the foundational site, moreover, for 
an entire strategic vision of a future, a “global war on terror” that 
by definition would never end and could never be won, but would 
23 Avi Mograbi, dir., Avenge but One of My Two Eyes (2005). Mograbi documents the 
Masada ritual, reenacted by the numerous tour guides to the site, which explicitly 
treats the fortress as a symbol of the modern Jewish state.
356 W. J. T. Mitchell
nonetheless serve as the founding framework for American foreign 
policy in the twenty-first century.24
The foundational sites of birth trauma, of construction and 
destruction, building and tearing down, are most dramatically evi-
dent in that modern foundational event we call “revolution.” This 
was the kind of site that until recently we thought had been “taken 
off the map,” as a poet friend of mine has put it.25 Only the monu-
ments and empty spaces are left on the sites of revolution, and 
they are generally images of the failure or betrayal of revolution, 
its replacement by tyrannical regimes. The statues that dominate 
public squares in the Arab world—of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, of 
Khaddafi in Libya, of Assad in Syria, of Mubarak in Egypt—are 
testimony to the transformation of popular revolutions into despo-
tisms. Tiananmen Square in Beijing, Red Square in Moscow, and 
the vast spaces of the Hitler’s Nuremberg rallies are transformed 
from places of public gathering into what Siegfried Kracauer called 
staging grounds for the “mass ornament,” enormous, disciplined 
crowds assembled to celebrate the cult of the founding father.26
The foundational sites of revolution are what Robert Smithson 
called “non-sites,” testifying to an absence. But recently, in move-
ments such as the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street, new sites 
have been found, and acts of founding have occurred. Weddings 
were celebrated and babies were born in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. The 
imagery and rhetoric of popular insurgency and revolution have 
been revived. Whether these events will be foundational, serving 
as cornerstones for new forms of life, is still in doubt. What is cer-
tain is that, as Neurath insisted, they will be imperfect rebuildings 
of a ship on the open sea. […]
24 See Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century 
(New York: Anchor Books, 2009). Bobbit gave the Arrow Lectures at Stanford 
in 2008, arguing that “the war on terror is no metaphor.” http://www.law.stan-
ford.edu/event/2008/03/06/stanford-center-on-ethics-arrow-lecture-series-
-on-ethics-and-leadership-philip-bobbitt-the-war-on-terror-is-no- (accessed 
December 24, 2014).
25 Janice Misurell-Mitchell, “ScatRap/Counterpoint” (1995), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ZaGm0OvxTss (accessed December 24, 2014). 
26 Kracauer, The Mass Ornament (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
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 Occupatio
It is not only nature that abhors a vacuum. An absolutely empty 
space is nearly inconceivable, if only because the most perfect void 
would still contain a few stray atoms. And in fact, most human spa-
ces, whether potential public spaces of appearance or the private 
closets and public streets of everyday life, are completely occupied. 
Filled with things—people, auto-mobiles, plants, animals, stones, 
air, water, statues, buildings.
But some spaces are set aside, are kept open, designated 
as “public.” They are what Foucault called heterotopias: parks, 
squares, plazas, the agora or kiva where people gather for com-
merce, gossip, or entertainment. They are supposed to belong to 
no one, to be a kind of civic terra nullius that anyone may enter. 
In the American Constitution, the foundational document left 
behind by the American Revolution, the first amendment impli-
citly guarantees the empty space of appearance, a  law against 
law that opens a site of freedom: “Congress shall make no law… 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances.”
The public square in America generally includes some monu-
ment to foundational violence (the war memorial) or construc-
tion—the statue of a city father. But it also holds a space open for 
assembly of the sort envisioned in the first amendment. In prac-
tice, however, the first amendment is loaded down with secondary 
qualifications—asterisks and exceptions, requirements to secure 
a permit, and strict limitations on the activities that may occur 
in the public space. No loudspeakers, no camping; hence Mic 
Chec (in Zucotti Park) and Occupy, everywhere. The figure that 
appeared against the ground in Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Wall Street was 
the tent, the encampment. And this was a rhetorical figure as well 
as a performative spectacle, literalizing the trope of occupatio, the 
seizure of the antagonist’s position, and the staging of an emptiness 
to be filled in later.
Occupatio generally stressed the refusal to speak of something, 
or the confession of an inability to describe or define. The refusal 
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of the members of the Occupy Movement to state their demands 
is a precise performance of the trope of occupatio, which speaks by 
refusing to speak, opening a negative space in language itself with 
a form of “expressive conduct.”27
It is just the opposite of the performative utterance in speech-
act theory, which does something by saying it (blessing, cursing, 
administering an oath, declaring a verdict). In contrast, Occupy 
says something by doing it. Its refusal to delegate a sovereign, rep-
resentative figure, a charismatic leader or “face” of the movement, 
is a declaration that real sovereignty has been redistributed for the 
moment in the assembled people in the space of appearance. Its 
refusal to describe or define the world it wants to create is accom-
panied by its manifestation of a nascent community, complete 
with differentiated roles—cooks, doctors, educators, builders, 
police—all assembled in a democratic, nonhierarchical polis.
Why did the tactics of Occupy go viral, spreading around the 
world, from Cairo to Madison, Wisconsin, from Damascus to Wall 
Street? The specific issues of each revolutionary site were quite dis-
tinct: authoritarian regimes in the Arab world; economic inequal-
ity in the United States. Is it not because it performed a parodic 
mimesis of a preexisting condition, namely the occupation of the 
world by a global system that has oppressed and impoverished 
the vast majority of the world’s population and degraded the 
environment at the same time, threatening spaceship earth with 
the possibility of foundering or running aground? Occupy per-
formed an uncanny reversal of the word “occupation,” which has 
become a synonym for the imposition of martial law on resistant 
populations. It also reversed, in the spectacle of the tent city, the 
meaning of the most iconic and viral image of occupied space we 
know of today, namely the camp or shanty town, the spaces set 
aside to incarcerate refugees, illegal immigrants, displaced persons, 
and resident aliens. Small wonder that Zucotti Park in New York 
became a haven for the homeless.
27 See my essay “Image, Space, Revolution: The Arts of Occupation,” in Occupy: 
Three Inquiries in Disobedience, coauthored with Michael Taussig and Bernard 
Harcourt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
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 Monuments and multitudes
When the masses depart from the foundational sites of revolution, 
what is left behind? Michelet’s answer is, empty space. But as he 
knew very well, a multitude of images, some of them memorable 
and monumental, remained behind in the archives and in popular 
memory. The Goddess of Reason, the Festival of the Supreme 
Being, and the ominous silhouette of the guillotine persist as icons 
of the Revolution. Delacroix’s Liberty Leading the People fixes the 
urban legend of the bare-breasted female revolutionary storming 
the barricades. Is it merely a coincidence that the spirit of popu-
lar, nonviolent revolution seems inevitably to be personified in 
a female figure? Consider, for instance, the Goddess of Democracy 
in Tiananmen Square, the Ballerina on the Bull of Occupy Wall 
Street, and the Woman with the Blue Brassiere in Tahrir Square 
(which was transformed overnight from an image of victimage to 
a banner of militant gathering).
Could these images be suggesting a deeper, more radical form 
of revolution than mere regime change, or even the foundation of 
a democratic constitution? Political theorist Bernard Harcourt has 
described the novelty of the Occupy Movement as a strategy of 
“political disobedience.”28 In contrast to civil disobedience, which 
deliberately violates laws in the name of freedom, and accepts the 
consequences of arrest, political disobedience involves the refusal 
to work within the unwritten laws of the political game—electing 
representatives, stating a policy agenda, forming a party, and so 
on. Camping in a public park may be civil disobedience, but what 
happened within the Occupy camps was political disobedience. 
Instead of attaching to a party, an ism, or even a social movement, 
it does something simpler and more fundamental: it manifests and 
performs the foundational site of the political as such, the space of 
appearance where human beings encounter each other as equals. 
Prior to politics in the usual sense of parties and defined social 
movements, Occupy was the clearing or opening before the work 
28 In Occupy: Three Inquiries in Disobedience, co-authored with Michael Taussig and 
myself (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
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of foundation. It was therefore necessarily transitory and transi-
tional, and was accurately represented by the figure of the Ballerina 
on the Bull. The Ballerina is not a figure of revolution; she does not 
seek to kill the Bull but to “take him by the horns” and use him as 
a support, to transform Wall Street into a foundational site for the 
performance of actually existing freedom and democracy.
The Egyptian Revolution, by contrast, attempted (unsuc-
cessfully) to move from its rebellious stage to its constitutional 
moment. As Arendt puts it, “Revolution on the one hand, and con-
stitution and foundation on the other, are like correlative conjunc-
tions” (117). “The end of rebellion is liberation, while the end of 
revolution is the foundation of freedom” and the making of a new 
constitution. One could see this already in the moment when the 
multitude assembled in Tahrir Square attempted to erect a giant 
wooden obelisk with the names of the martyrs engraved on it. This 
act, which resonated with memories of Tiananmen Square, on the 
one hand, and the Washington Monument, on the other, was an 
uncanny image of return, given the obelisk’s original home as an 
Egyptian monument. Given the long history of removal and dislo-
cation of the obelisk from Egypt to Rome to Napoleonic Paris to 
Washington, DC, it was as if the figure of constitutional foundation 
had been returned to its proper site. But instead of serving as a sym-
bol of pharaonic and phallic power, it became, like the Washington 
Monument (whose individual stones are understood to represent 
the multitude of citizens), a symbol of the unity of a people.
 Conclusions
The only way to conclude an essay of this sort is with the trope of 
occupatio. Since the events I have been describing are happening in 
the present, and are still unfolding,29 it would be foolish to predict 
final outcomes. And in fact, as Otto Neurath foresaw, there are no 
final outcomes in human history, only temporary and imperfect 
repairs to that leaky boat called “spaceship earth” in which we find 
29 Something called “Occupy Central” flared up with attempts to occupy multina-
tional banks in Hong Kong as recently as June 2014.
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ourselves. If space permitted, and I had a crystal ball, here is what 
I would have wanted to discuss:
—I would have discussed further the contrast between foun-
dation and founding or grounding, between the base of an archi-
tectural structure and the acts of clearing and assembling that must 
precede it.
—I would have explored more fully the relation of  violence and 
foundation, particularly Walter Benjamin’s notion of “law-making 
violence” and Giorgio Agamben’s reflection on the “camp” as the 
enduring site of the state of exception and its place as a symptom 
of systemic violence that reduces populations to a condition of 
“bare life.”
—I would have elaborated this contrast further in terms of 
Edward Said’s distinction between “origins” and “beginnings”: ori-
gin as the mythic, fetishized foundation, the completed structure 
with all its aura; beginning as the modest but often decisively cata-
lytic events that launch a moment and may produce a foundation. 
I would have linked this further to Arendt’s “space of appearance” 
(as beginning) and the built public space that remains empty. And 
of course I would have linked this back to the image of One Vase/
Two Faces. 
—I would have reflected on the contrast between the images 
of founding and foundation in terms of the architectural structure 
and the ship that can never reach a dry dock for total repair. Inevi-
tably, these metaphors would have led to the language of running 
aground and foundering.
—I  would have expanded on the totemic, fetishistic, and 
idolatrous character of foundational sites, their links with geo-
mancy, sacrifice, and sacred space – the practice of idolatry of 
course associated with images of the sovereign as a living god who 
contains multitudes within his body, and the rituals of mass orna-
ment that reinforce the spectacular character of power. This would 
necessarily lead to a consideration of “totemic” foundational sites 
of communal gathering, of which Occupy is clearly an instance. 
Note that Occupy gatherings are not merely “demonstrations” but 
mini-communities; Occupy Wall Street provided food, clothing, 
shelter, and medical aid to visitors.
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And I would have raised this questions for further discussion:
—Are “foundational sites” only to be located as physical loca-
tions in real space? Could a foundational site be virtual and mov-
able? Is a constitution itself a foundational site, a virtual structure 
of laws and governmental architecture that can sustain and prolong 
the space of appearance? The “founding fathers” of the American 
Constitution regarded themselves as “farmers” of an architectural 
structure. But was that structure grounded in abstract “bedrock 
principles,” or was it more like the Ark of the Covenant, a ship of 
state launched on a voyage to a Promised Land?
—Is it possible to create foundational sites without deify-
ing the images of “founding fathers” and initiating the inevitable 
Oedipal cycle that follows them? Could the spaceship earth be 
reframed as a mother ship, the womb in which a new humanity 
might be born?
—To what extent will be events of 2011 be remembered as 
revo lutionary? Which of them will turn out to be foundational, 
and which will be remembered as merely gestural acts, perfor-
mances of founding and grounding? Have cornerstones been laid 
for structures that will grow into durable spaces of appearance, 
nurseries for a rebirth of the political? Or will face-to-face encoun-
ters give way to the merely monumental, the vase as the funerary 
urn of failed revolutions? 
Bibliografia
Arendt Hannah (1959), The Human Condition, Doubleday, Garden City, 
NY.
Arendt Hannah (1963), On Revolution, Viking Press, New York.
Barthes Roland (1981), Camera Lucida, trans. R. Howard, Hill & Wang, 
New York.
Benjamin Walter (2002), Selected Writings, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA.
Bobbitt Philip (2009), Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First 
Century, Anchor Books, New York.
Bordo Jonathan  (2003), Monuments and Memory. Made and Unmade, ed. 
M. Olin, R. Nelson, University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
363Iconology, visual culture and media aestetics
Jones Caroline (2008), Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg and the 
Bureaucratization of the Senses, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Kittler Friedrich (1999), Gramaphone Film Typewriter, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, CA.
Kracauer Siegfried (1995), The Mass Ornament, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Krauss Rosalind (2000), Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age of the 
Post-Medium Condition, Thames and Hudson, New York.
Massumi Brian (2002), Parables for the Virtual, Duke University Press, 
Durham, NC.
Nietzsche Friedrich (2003), Genealogy of Morals, trans. H.B. Samuel, 
Dover, New York.
Onega Susana (1999), Metafiction and Myth in the Novels of Peter Ackroyd, 
Camden House, Columbia, SC.
Rancière Jacques (2009), The Future of the image, Verso, New York.
Snyder Joel (1980), Picturing Vision, “Critical Inquiry” 1980 nr 3.
Wiliams Raymond (1977), Marxism and Literature, Oxford University 
Press, New York.
Wolfe Tom (1976), The Painted World, Bantam Books, New York.
W. J. T. Mitchell
Iconology, visual culture and media aestetics
The article contains fragments of three chapters form the book Image Sci-
ence. Iconology, Visual Culture and Media Aesthetics (Chicago 2015), titled 
The are no Visual Media, Back to the Drawing Board and Foundational Sites 
and Occupied Spaces. W. J. T. Mitchell created in his previous works the key 
concepts which imply an approach to images as true objects of investiga-
tion – an “image science”. Author, continuing with his influential line of 
thoughts, amplifies interdisciplinary studies of visual media. The chapters 
also delve into such topics as conections between new media and archi-
tecture or the occupation of space in contemporary popular uprisings. 
Image science is a call for a method of studying images that overcomes the 
“two-culture split” between the natural and human sciences.
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W. J. T. Mitchell (William John Thomas) – profesor anglistyki i historii 
sztuki na Uniwersytecie Chicagowskim. Od 1971 redaguje naukowy perio-
364 W. J. T. Mitchell
dyk „Critical Inquiry”. Autor książek o przełomowym znaczeniu dla rozwoju 
współczesnej ikonologii, m. in. Iconology (Chicago 1986), Picture Theory 
(Chicago 1994), The Last Dinosaur Book (Chicago 1998), What Do Pictures 
Want (Chicago 2005) czy Cloning Terror: The War of Images 9/11 to the Present 
(Chicago 2011).
